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The first documented British outbreak of Shiga toxin-
producing Escherichia coli (STEC) O55:H7 began in the 
county of Dorset, England, in July 2014. Since then, 
there have been a total of 31 cases of which 13 pre-
sented with haemolytic uraemic syndrome (HUS). The 
outbreak strain had Shiga toxin (Stx) subtype 2a asso-
ciated with an elevated risk of HUS. This strain had 
not previously been isolated from humans or animals 
in England. The only epidemiological link was living in 
or having close links to two areas in Dorset. Extensive 
investigations included testing of animals and house-
hold pets. Control measures included extended 
screening, iterative interviewing and exclusion of 
cases and high risk contacts. Whole genome sequenc-
ing (WGS) confirmed that all the cases were infected 
with similar strains. A specific source could not be 
identified. The combination of epidemiological investi-
gation and WGS indicated, however, that this outbreak 
was possibly caused by recurrent introductions from 
a local endemic zoonotic source, that a highly similar 
endemic reservoir appears to exist in the Republic of 
Ireland but has not been identified elsewhere, and 
that a subset of cases was associated with human-to-
human transmission in a nursery.
Introduction
Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli (STEC) is known 
to cause self-limiting diarrhoeal illness, sometimes 
bloody diarrhoea and complications such as haemor-
rhagic colitis and haemolytic uraemic syndrome (HUS) 
[1-3]. STEC O157:H7 is the most common serotype in 
England while the incidence of non-O157 STEC sero-
types such as O26, O45, O103, O111, O121 and O145, 
some of which have been implicated in a number of 
outbreaks internationally [4-8], may be under-reported 
in the English national surveillance system run by 
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Public Health England (PHE). This is due to the lack of 
general applicability of current culture-based detection 
methods [9,10].
The signal
PHE South East Centre was notified in July 2014 of 
two children with HUS in the county of Dorset. Further 
cases, all living in Dorset, were identified during the 
following months, including an outbreak at a nursery. 
Faecal specimens tested at the local hospital labora-
tory were negative for STEC O157. Further testing at the 
Gastrointestinal Bacterial Reference Unit (GBRU) PHE, 
Colindale, London, identified the causative organism 
as STEC O55:H7 which carried the Shiga toxin gene 
(stx2) and the intimin-encoding gene eae (E. coli attach-
ing and effacing). The combination of these virulence 
genes is associated with an elevated risk of HUS [11]. 
Phylogenetic analysis using whole genome sequencing 
(WGS) has indicated STEC O55:H7 to be the ancestor of 
the highly pathogenic clone STEC O157:H7 [12].
The reference laboratory in the Republic of Ireland (ROI) 
routinely send a sub-set of non-O157 STEC to GBRU for 
serotyping. A search of GBRU’s database, following 
detection of the STEC non-O157-related HUS cases in 
Dorset, revealed that nine cases of STEC O55:H7 had 
occurred in ROI between 2012 and 2014. However, 
prior to July 2014 STEC O55:H7 had not been isolated 
from human cases or animals in England. The outbreak 
starting in July 2014 was, therefore, the first known 
outbreak in England of STEC O55:H7 causing severe 
illness. Apart from human-to-human transmission, 
we considered three competing hypotheses based on 
established [13] STEC O55:H7 transmission pathways: 
(i) consumption of contaminated food or drinking 
water; (ii) specific recreational or environmental expo-
sure; (iii) epizootic vector and/or general environmen-
tal contamination. The objectives of our investigation 
were case finding, investigating the source and con-
trolling the outbreak.
Methods
Epidemiological investigations
Case definitions
A confirmed case was defined as an individual with 
STEC O55:H7 identified by culture from a faecal speci-
men or with antibodies to the lipopolysaccharide (LPS) 
of E. coli O55 identified by serology, and having spent 
time in Dorset in the 14 days before onset, between 
June 2014 and September 2015. A second inclusion 
criterion of being within 5 single nucleotide polymor-
phisms (SNPs) of the outbreak strain, where WGS was 
available, was added on 1 October 2015 to increase the 
specificity of the case definition by requiring genetic 
relatedness between isolates. Confirmed cases were 
further categorised as either symptomatic (with symp-
toms of gastrointestinal disease, haemorrhagic coli-
tis, HUS or thrombotic thrombocytopenic purpura) or 
asymptomatic. Probable cases were individuals with 
the symptoms listed above and an epidemiological link 
to a confirmed case, or nursery cases who were culture 
negative on screening but eae positive on PCR.
Case finding is described under microbiological inves-
tigations, below.
Exposure histories
National enhanced surveillance for STEC at PHE 
includes collection and analysis of standardised micro-
biological, demographic, clinical, and exposure data 
on all cases [10]. We extended the questionnaire [14] 
to collect detailed histories from symptomatic cases 
about places visited, activities undertaken and food 
consumed in the 14 days before symptom onset. This 
Figure 1
Confirmed cases of Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli 055:H7, Dorset, July 2014−September 2015 (n=31)
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was an extension of the usual 7-day period used for 
STEC O157 investigations since the incubation period 
for STEC O55 is unknown and we wanted to identify all 
potentially important exposures. Asymptomatic cases 
were also followed up using the same enhanced ques-
tionnaire with a focus on activities during the period 
beginning 14 days before the onset of symptoms of the 
associated primary, symptomatic case.
We used an iterative re-interviewing process, re-
contacting previous cases for direct questioning on 
all new exposures that were reported by later cases. 
Re-interviews included extended food consumption 
histories, review of one-month shopping history and 
exposure to local events, venues, the outdoor envi-
ronment, animals and pet food. Staff and parents in a 
nursery cluster completed a questionnaire on illness, 
nursery attendance, activities and staff roles.
We undertook network mapping to visualise any com-
mon exposures between cases using i2 Analyst’s 
Notebook (IBM Corporation, New York, United States 
(US)).
Environmental investigations
Food, water, environmental and animal samples
Environmental Health Officers (EHOs) inspected and 
collected food, water and environmental samples from 
venues visited by cases which included a restaurant 
chain, mobile food vendor, public gardens and a lily 
pond. Additional environmental samples were collected 
using standard samples and swabs, faecal pots and 
‘boot socks’, a previously described method of sample 
collection originally conceived to detect Campylobacter 
present in the environment [15]. These additional sam-
ples were collected from cases’ gardens, parks and 
other outdoor areas visited them, bird sanctuaries and 
local cattle grazing areas. Flood prone areas were also 
targeted, focusing on areas with wildlife activity and 
those downstream of cattle populations, as identified 
by agricultural census data. Waterways and surface 
water runoff were sampled by the national Environment 
Agency Wessex office, Blandford, Dorset.
After a positive cat faecal sample had been obtained, 
we retrospectively collected faecal specimens from 
pet dogs and cats of all cases from July 2014 onwards. 
Seventeen faecal specimens were taken from goats, 
cattle and horses at a petting farm, where a veterinary 
risk assessment was undertaken.
Food chain analysis
The Food Standards Agency (FSA) carried out supply 
chain investigations linked to food consumed by cases 
and pets. Not all food consumed was traced back; 
instead the focus was on identifying retail distribution 
local to the Dorset area that differed from supply to the 
rest of the country.
Figure 2
Maximum likelihood phylogeny of STEC O55:H7 isolates 
showing the monophyletic cluster associated with the 
outbreak cases and closely related strains from the 
Republic of Ireland
0.02
Nursery (Case 20)
ROI
ROI
Family A (Case 2)
Nursery (Case 12)
Cat (other)
Family B (Case 18)
Nursery (Case 16)
Family B (Case 10)
Nursery (Case 13)
Nursery (Case 8)
case 4
Family C (Case 22)
Nursery (Case 15)
ROI
Nursery (Case 14)
ROI
Family B (Case 17)
Cat (Case 26)
Case 26
Nursery (Case 6)
Nursery (Case 7)
Family C (Case 24)
Family A (Case 3)
Family C (Case 25)
Family E (Case 28)
ROI
Family E (Case 29)
Family C (Case 23)
Nursery (Case 11)
Family D (Case 27)
ROI: Republic of Ireland; SNP: single nucleotide polymorphisms; STEC: 
Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli.
The phylogeny was constructed based on 38 core genome SNPs with all 
isolates within 5 SNPs of each other
4 www.eurosurveillance.org
Hydrological analysis
We identified the dates of flooding from online media 
reports for the period December 2014 to September 
2015 for a stream that flows through a popular public 
garden before discharging into the sea in Bournemouth. 
Additional theoretical flooding events in this period 
were identified from the 99th percentile of the distribu-
tion of measured stream depth data but for which there 
were no online media reports. For primary cases, resi-
dent in or having visited Bournemouth before illness, 
we calculated the delay between the dates of flooding 
events and symptom onset to identify plausible tempo-
ral associations between flooding and illness.
Microbiological investigations
Case finding
Prior to the identification of STEC O55:H7 as the aetio-
logical agent of this outbreak, serum samples from 
initial cases with HUS that were culture negative for 
STEC O157 were assessed for the presence of anti-
bodies to the LPS of non-O157 serogroups (O26, O55, 
O103, O111, O128 and O145) at GBRU in PHE Colindale 
[16]. Faecal specimens were tested using PCR [17] at 
GBRU for the presence of stx genes and cultured on 
MacConkey, Sorbitol MacConkey (SMAC) and cefixime-
tellurite SMAC (CTSMAC) agar. For all positive speci-
mens, 10 colonies were retested using the same PCR. 
Those colonies testing positive for stx were identified 
biochemically, serotyped and characterised by addi-
tional PCR assays [17]. STEC guidelines [18] recom-
mend testing faecal specimens for non-O157 STEC from 
HUS patients, cases of bloody diarrhoea where STEC 
is suspected, and stx PCR-positive faecal specimens 
at the local hospital laboratory. All close contacts of 
cases were screened via testing of serum and/or faecal 
specimens, including all children and staff in a nursery 
cluster.
From December 2014 to January 2015 and again from 
June 2015, active case finding included screening of 
faecal specimens from all individuals with bloody diar-
rhoea by Dorset laboratories, with prospective referral 
of negative specimens to GBRU for additional testing. In 
August 2015, enhanced testing was introduced in one 
Dorset laboratory and by October 2015, this was rep-
licated in the remaining two laboratories and the PHE 
Specialist Laboratory in Southampton. This involved 
a 12-week extended testing regime, which analysed 
specimens from both primary and secondary care, with 
all diarrhoeal specimens tested using an additional 
MacConkey Agar with Sorbitol (SMAC) agar plate. Any 
non-sorbitol fermenting isolates of E. coli were sent to 
GBRU for further characterisation and typing.
Food, water and environmental specimens
Animal faecal specimens were analysed by GBRU using 
the same protocol as for human faecal specimens. All 
other samples were analysed by PHE’s Food, Water 
and Environmental (FWE) Microbiology laboratories. 
At FWE, real-time PCR was used to examine samples 
for the presence of STEC based on CEN/ISO TS 13136 
[19]. Water samples (up to 1 L) were filtered and filtrates 
enriched in 100 mL Modified Tryptone Soya Broth 
(mTSB). Bootsocks were immersed in 250 mL mTSB 
and swabs were immersed in 90 mL mTSB. Enrichment 
broths that were PCR-positive for stx were sub-cultured 
onto MacConkey and SMAC agar and up to 50 colonies 
retested using the same PCR assay. Any STEC strains 
isolated were sent to GBRU for further characterisation.
Whole genome sequencing
All isolates of STEC O55:H7 from this outbreak cul-
tured from 24 human and two animal faecal specimens 
together with 11 background STEC O55:H7 isolates 
from ROI contained within the PHE archive were whole 
genome sequenced by PHE Genome Sequencing Unit 
using Nextera library preparation on the Illumina HiSeq 
2,500 run in fast mode according to the manufacturers’ 
instructions [20]. All sequences were mapped against 
the sequence of the E. coli O55:H7 reference strain 
CB9615 (GenBank accession number: CP001846.1) 
using BWA-MEM [19]. SNPs were identified using GATK2 
[21] in unified genotyper mode. Core genome positions 
that had a high quality SNP (> 90% consensus, mini-
mum depth 10x, MQ ≥ 30) in at least one strain were 
extracted and RaxML [21] used to derive the maximum 
likelihood phylogeny of the isolates under the GTRCAT 
model of evolution. FASTQ reads from all sequences 
in this study can be found at the PHE Pathogens 
BioProject at the National Center for Biotechnology 
Information (accession number: PRJNA315192).
International investigations
The public health team in the ROI administered the PHE 
STEC questionnaire to earlier Irish cases and provided 
additional information on demographics and shared 
exposures of these cases. Postcodes of the primary 
cases in Dorset and the counties where infected indi-
viduals reside in ROI were taken as points of reference 
to examine both large scale migration and smaller 
regional movements of different migratory bird species 
using the British Trust for Ornithology mapping tool 
[22]. Live cattle movements between ROI and Dorset in 
2013 and 2014 were mapped by date of movement and 
the postcode of the recipient farms/markets.
Results
Epidemiological investigation
From July 2014 to September 2015 we identified 31 
confirmed cases; 28 were associated with six epide-
miological clusters (Table), with one cluster (family 
B) arising due to two (co)primary cases with symptom 
onset on the same day. Symptom onset was seasonal, 
occurring between July and November 2014 and May to 
September 2015 (Figure 1). There were three probable 
cases associated with the nursery and no probable 
community cases.
Of 21 cases symptomatic with HUS, bloody diarrhoea or 
diarrhoea (21/31), 18 were confirmed on faecal culture 
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and three by serology. Of the 10 asymptomatic cases 
(10/31), six were culture-positive and four were identi-
fied by serology. Twenty of the 31 cases were children, 
16 were below the age of 5 years and 11 of the 20 chil-
dren developed HUS (Table). Across all cases, HUS was 
more common (13/31) than expected for STEC O157 
(172/3,323; 5%, chi-squared p < 0.0001) [2].
The network analysis revealed nine of the 10 (co)pri-
mary cases had domestic contact with cats (5/10) and/
or dogs (5/10). In addition to domestic animal con-
tact, the only common factor among the (co)primary 
cases was residing in or around, or having links to, 
Bournemouth and Weymouth in Dorset.
Nursery cluster
Twelve cases (of whom six were symptomatic) were 
associated with a nursery (Figure 1, Table), including 
staff, children and their household contacts. Twelve 
staff members in the nursery responded to the staff 
questionnaire (12/30), revealing a history of diarrhoea 
in three screen-negative staff in the previous month 
including one with a family connection to a confirmed 
case. Questionnaires on nursery children had a poor 
response rate of 14% but identified a child that may 
have been previously symptomatic. Six cases in chil-
dren (two symptomatic) were identified from the 99 
of 112 staff members and children screened. An addi-
tional three children were identified who were culture-
negative but PCR positive for the eae (intimin) gene 
only, meaning they were defined as probable cases at 
the point of screening. One of these three children had 
been previously symptomatic and had a delay of ten 
days between symptom onset and specimen collection.
The delay between symptom onset and specimen col-
lection for the confirmed nursery cases ranged from 0 
to 9 days (mean: 5 days). The optimum time for testing 
is as soon as possible after onset however 5 days is 
still a satisfactory timeframe as PCR is able to detect 
dead bacteria. The investigation did not reveal any 
possible food or environmental sources of transmis-
sion at the nursery and no epidemiological links were 
identified between the primary nursery and primary 
community cases.
Figure 3
Map of Dorset cattle density, major rivers, flood zones and (co) primary cases’ postcodes, outbreak of Shiga toxin-producing 
Escherichia coli 055:H7, Dorset, July 2014−September 2015
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Environmental investigation
Food, water, environmental and animal samples
No STEC O55:H7 was isolated from over 100 food, water 
and environmental samples or from 17 animal samples 
from the petting farm. STEC O55:H7 was isolated from 
a cat faecal specimen, taken from a concrete path out-
side the home of the primary case in Family C (Case 
22). The pet cat of this household had been ill but 
tested negative. All pets of (co)primary cases tested 
retrospectively following this finding yielded negative 
results but the faeces of a symptomatic pet cat, tested 
prospectively, was positive for STEC O55:H7. This cat 
belonged to case 26, who was not associated with an 
epidemiological cluster, and the cat’s illness preceded 
symptom onset in the case. These two positive cat 
specimens were taken ca 4.5 km and two months apart.
Food chain analysis
The food chain analysis did not identify any prod-
uct lines that were sourced specifically for retailers 
in the Dorset area. No links were identified between 
the premises investigated, including two nurseries, 
two petting farms, a local butcher, an abattoir, a café, 
takeaway restaurants, mobile food vans and a national 
chain of restaurants. There were no significant com-
monalities between food items consumed by the pets 
and all pet food brands reported had national distribu-
tion networks.
Hydrological data analysis
Four media reports of flooding events and two addi-
tional theoretical flooding events were identified dur-
ing the period from December 2014 to September 2015. 
After excluding one theoretical event which occurred 
during January 2015 when there were no cases, the 
remaining five flooding events occurred 1–9 days 
(median: 8 days) before symptom onset among five 
of the six (co)primary cases linked to Bournemouth. 
Three of these cases reported having visited the public 
gardens and/or Bournemouth beach in their exposure 
histories.
Microbiological investigation
Case finding
The outbreak strain cultures were serotyped as 
STEC O55:H7, tested positive for the presence of eae 
(intimin), had a stx subtype profile that was stx2a only 
and appeared as non-sorbitol fermenting colonies on 
SMAC but failed to grow on CTSMAC. Only one case 
(Case 26, who was not associated with any epide-
miological cluster) was identified from the extended 
screening of 4,200 bloody diarrhoea specimens. 
Clearance for most cases was between 7 and 84 days 
(mean: 43 days) however STEC O55:H7 continued to be 
detected in the faeces of an asymptomatic 7-year old 
case for 10 months.
Whole genome sequencing
All Dorset isolates from 24 cases and two cats were 
similar to each other forming a distinct clade within five 
SNP differences of the outbreak strain of STEC O55:H7. 
They were very similar (1–12 SNPs) to six Irish isolates 
(five were within 5 SNPs) from 2013 to 2014 but rela-
tively distant (> 250 SNPs) from the five earlier Irish iso-
lates. Isolates linked to the nursery were more closely 
related to each other than to isolates from the earlier 
cases in 2014 (Figure 2). Despite a period of almost 
4 weeks between symptomatic cases in the nursery, 
phylogenetic analysis showed the isolates from three 
cases from weeks 47 and 48 in 2014 were identical to 
the isolate from the case identified in week 43, consist-
ent with human-to-human transmission. Case 1 and the 
primary nursery case (Case 5) were diagnosed by serol-
ogy therefore no isolate was available for sequencing.
International investigations
Other STEC O55 isolates
All Irish cases were living in counties along the east 
coast and there were no common exposures between 
previous Irish cases occurring during 2012–14. There 
were no epidemiological links between the Dorset 
cases and the Irish cases. With the exception of the 
isolates from ROI, other STEC O55 isolates reported 
elsewhere in Europe in 2014 had different microbio-
logical characteristics than the Dorset cluster (differ-
ent serotype, stx profile and ability to ferment sorbitol) 
thus were not included in this investigation. There were 
three E. coli O55 cases elsewhere in England reported 
during the period of the outbreak who did not meet the 
outbreak case definition. One was STEC O55:H9 stx2d, 
another was a returning traveller who had positive 
serology only for E. coli O55 and therefore the strain 
could not be identified whilst the third case was STEC 
O55:H7 but was 10 SNPs apart from the outbreak WGS 
cluster and had no epidemiological link to Dorset.
Animal movement
Bird populations remained constant in the south west 
and south east England from 2013 to 2015, suggest-
ing no new risks. Teal and black-headed gulls were 
the only species identified where there was signifi-
cant level of movement between ROI, south England 
and Europe. Black headed gulls are common in Great 
Britain and there are large colonies along the south 
and east coasts of England.
A total of 1,149 cattle from ROI were moved to 69 sepa-
rate premises in Dorset in the two year period between 
2013 and 2014. These premises are located mainly 
in the north and west of the county, away from, but 
upstream of, the residences of (co)primary cases in the 
south of the county near the coast (Figure 3).
Control measures and communication
We managed cases and contacts using national STEC 
guidance [18], including appropriate exclusion from 
work, school or childcare of confirmed cases and 
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contacts at increased risk of transmission, until shown 
microbiologically to have cleared the infection [18]. We 
provided advice on hand and food hygiene together 
with guidance on environmental cleaning and disin-
fection to cases and contacts and to venues such as a 
petting farm, nursery and schools. Staff and children 
were screened at the nursery; a measure that is not in 
the national guidance but has been used in other out-
breaks [23]. In total, eight children were excluded for a 
period of time ranging from 7 to 84 days until microbio-
logical clearance.
The nursery with the cluster of cases closed voluntar-
ily on 26 November 2014 to facilitate screening of staff 
and children and deep cleaning of the premises.
Proactive public messages initially focused on basic 
infection control measures but became more specific, 
advising people to be extra vigilant with hand hygiene 
before preparing food and after contact with pets and 
animals. In response to widespread media interest, 
including coverage criticising PHE’s handling of the 
outbreak, the regional BBC Health Correspondent was 
offered a full access briefing including a visit to PHE 
laboratories. This resulted in factually accurate report-
ing and reiteration of the public health messages in a 
BBC television documentary in November 2015, with 
content promoted on its Facebook page [24].
Discussion
In addition to being the first recorded outbreak of STEC 
O55:H7 in England, striking features of the outbreak 
include its seasonality, the high proportion of cases 
developing HUS (13/31) compared with the background 
rate for STEC O157 (5%) [2] and the geographical com-
ponent linking all (co)primary cases to Bournemouth 
and Weymouth in Dorset. Evidence of human-to-human 
transmission of STEC O55:H7 within the nursery cluster 
was shown by the propagated epidemic curve and WGS 
with cases in this cluster forming a largely homogenous 
monophyletic sub-cluster among isolates in the out-
break as a whole. Overall, isolates showed more diver-
sity than would be expected in a STEC point-source 
outbreak [25]. The genetic similarity between isolates 
taken from Dorset cases and the 2013–14 Irish cases 
suggests infection by the same or closely related popu-
lations of STEC O55:H7 and may represent a common 
zoonotic reservoir. Enhanced surveillance suggested 
infection to be less widespread than feared in the 
Dorset population. Contacts were tested more widely 
than normal (for a STEC outbreak) using culture/PCR 
and/or serology ensuring the identification of asymp-
tomatic household contacts. To date there have been 
no further cases in this WGS cluster, although other 
E. coli O55 cases have occurred elsewhere in England. 
Despite the use of an iterative re-interviewing pro-
cess, no common exposures linked all primary cases 
and food, water and environmental testing was nega-
tive for contamination by STEC O55:H7. There was little 
evidence to support the hypotheses of contaminated 
Table
Characteristics of confirmed cases of Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli O55:H7, Dorset, England, June 2014−September 
2015 (n=31)
Variable Description All cases Children (0–4 years)
Children 
(5–17 years)
Adults 
(18–69 years)
Total number 31 16 4 11 
Symptomatica 
Yes 21 12  3            6           
No 10 4 1 5
HUS 
Yes 13 9 2 2
No 18 7 2 9
Sex 
Male 13 8 2 3
Female 18 8 2 8
Age (years) 
Mean (SD) 16 (19) 2.2 (1.1) 9.8 (3.3) 39 (14)
Median (range) 4 (0–69) 2 (0–4) 9.5 (6–14) 35 (25–69)
  
  
  
Epidemiological cluster
Noneb 3 1 1 1
  Family A        2 1 0 1
Nursery 12 9 0 3
Family B 5 2 1 2
Family C 4 1 1 2
Family D 2 1 0 1
Family E 3 1 1 1
HUS: haemolytic uraemic syndrome; SD: standard deviation.
a Symptoms included HUS (13/21), bloody diarrhoea (3/21) and diarrhoea (5/21).
b Case numbers 1, 4 and 26 were not associated with epidemiological clusters.
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food items or drinking water or a specific recreational/
environmental exposure. Given this, and the geo-
graphical clustering around two areas of Dorset, the 
third hypothesis of a local endemic zoonotic infection 
acquired in humans from infected pets and/or directly 
from the environment seems the most likely cause of 
this outbreak.
Due to the protracted nature of the outbreak, problems 
in recall may have hampered the effectiveness of the 
iterative re-interviewing approach, given the time lag 
between cases. It is possible that using the onset date 
of the associated primary case as the starting point for 
a 14-day exposure history-taking among asymptomatic 
cases missed important exposures if their infection had 
been acquired earlier. However, all of the asymptomatic 
cases were picked up through screening of contacts or 
nursery screening, all those identified by serology were 
epidemiologically linked to a WGS-confirmed case and 
many asymptomatic cases were adult household con-
tacts of children, so it is likely that the majority of them 
were secondary cases whose infection was acquired by 
human-to-human transmission. Even if putative expo-
sures had been identified, having only ten (co)primary 
cases would have made hypothesis testing via an ana-
lytical study challenging.
The environmental hypothesis appears most likely 
although there were no positive environmental samples 
(including boot socks, animal faeces, bird sanctuaries 
or water) to confirm it. The delay between symptom 
onset and environmental sampling could have reduced 
the chance of a positive finding and sensitivity of direct 
culturing from faeces can be poor if STEC numbers are 
low. Similar delays may also have reduced the likeli-
hood of finding a positive sample among pets. There 
is currently no evidence of STEC O55:H7 in the cattle 
population in the United Kingdom but cattle and other 
ruminants are a known source of STEC [26]. Delays 
between infection and sampling, particularly among 
screened contacts, may also have led to cases being 
missed early in the outbreak. However, after the first 
few cases we tested contacts more widely than nor-
mal for a STEC outbreak and detected a number of 
asymptomatic household contacts using serology, so 
we are confident that any symptomatic contacts would 
also have been identified microbiologically, either via 
culture or serology. Furthermore, it is possible that 
asymptomatic or mild diarrhoeal illness may have been 
underestimated as most case ascertainment of STEC 
O55:H7 was due to presentation with HUS, with non-
HUS-associated infections being missed apart from the 
periods of enhanced surveillance. The absence of addi-
tional cases arising from the testing of all diarrhoeal 
specimens from local and regional laboratories for 
STEC O55:H7 over a 12-week period is evidence against 
this, however, this extended testing regime occurred in 
the autumn, when fewer or no cases were expected.
STEC O55:H7 is phylogenetically closely related to STEC 
O157:H7 [12,25] and assumed therefore to have similar 
exposure risks and transmission routes. The observed 
seasonality (July–October 2014; May–September 2015) 
is similar to that seen for STEC O157 (April–September) 
in England and Wales [27]. This may reflect greater 
time spent outdoors during warmer months of the year, 
increasing exposure to the environment. Migratory 
birds as a transmission source common to Dorset and 
ROI could also help explain both the seasonality and 
genetic similarity between Irish and Dorset cases and 
birds (rooks) have previously been linked to STEC O157 
infection in children [28]. The analysis focused on bird 
migration between ROI and Dorset but it is also pos-
sible that STEC O55:H7 was introduced by migratory 
bird species, with a shared winter feeding ground, that 
use the coast of ROI and the coast of England as des-
tinations for summer feeding. In five of the six primary 
cases linked to Bournemouth, symptom onset occurred 
in a period of 1–9 days following flooding events, sug-
gesting these events could have played a role. Three of 
these four cases reported visiting the public gardens or 
beach in Bournemouth and their illness could plausibly 
be explained by exposure to land recently flooded by 
stream water contaminated by animal faeces or to the 
sea into which the stream discharges. The STEC O55:H7 
positive faecal specimens from two cats provided evi-
dence that domestic pets may act as a vector for the 
pathogen and may support a hypothesis of an environ-
mental or local zoonotic reservoir. This is consistent 
with reports of STEC O145 serotypes in sporadic HUS 
in children which were also isolated from their asymp-
tomatic pet cats [29,30]. There were no common fac-
tors found for foods consumed by the pets, but it was 
not possible from the information collected to deter-
mine the extent to which cases’ pets interacted with 
the rural environment, wildlife or rodents. It is possible 
that there are several vectors responsible for the envi-
ronmental spread and cases could also have acquired 
STEC O55:H7 directly from the environment.
This outbreak provides a number of learning points. 
Proactive media engagement was important and helped 
to ensure risk communication throughout the outbreak 
was effective and that the timing and control of infor-
mation could be maintained by PHE. The evidence from 
WGS of isolates forming a closely related cluster was 
an important driver behind the extensive investigations 
undertaken. As WGS is used increasingly in England for 
outbreak investigation and detection, it is likely to be 
a driver in the future for investigating small outbreaks 
of illness that are not clearly linked epidemiologically 
[31,32].
The introduction of an additional SMAC agar plate 
into local laboratory processes helped reduce the 
number of cultures being sent to GBRU and enabled 
local detection of likely STEC O55:H7 in the absence 
of PCR. Enhanced surveillance through local laborato-
ries, WGS, boot sock sampling and the combined use 
of hydrological and cattle census data are all meth-
ods that could be adapted and applied when investi-
gating outbreaks of emerging pathogens with unclear 
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aetiology. We conclude that although the cause of this 
outbreak remains elusive the varied investigations 
helped narrow the focus to a dispersed environmental 
source and/or a zoonotic reservoir.
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